A New Global Era?

10/23/2024

Recent books in recent years seem to converge on the idea that the world is entering or has already begun a new era. To wit: Fareed Zakaria's Age of Revolutions, George Friedman's The Storm Before the Calm, Jim Sciutto's The Return of Great Powers, Peter Zeihan's, The End of the World is Just the Beginning, Bruno Maçães', History Has Begun.

These books deal primarily with changing geopolitical realities like the rise of China, NATO's expansion, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The American-led world order is under stress. Instability is spreading and the center cannot hold.

Most also touch on global trade and economics and the disruptive political impacts of new technologies like social media and artificial intelligence. Zakaria writes, for example, that periods of fast-changing technologies in the past have led to fast social changes that, in turn, led to populist politics to stop or slow down the pace of change. These are ages of revolutions, and according to Zakaria, we are currently living in one now.

Similarly, George Friedman looks to previous generations for possible clues to where the USA and the world are in terms of political and economic cycles. He argues that each generation rebels in some fashion against that of their parents. The Greatest Generation, for example, "went to work" when the world order fell apart. They fought in World War II, defeated fascism in Europe and militarism in Asia, then built a functional and prosperous economy. Baby Boomers rebelled against expectations of a 9-to-5 work life and also worked to solve social ills, elevating Civil Rights, environmental, and a host of other social movements. As the Post-World War 2 era frays, new generations will be left with the task of possibly fending off a new great evil or rival, then building a new geopolitical world and economic order.

Friedman argues that the upheavals of the 2010s and early 2020s is the death knell of the current political order. Old solutions no longer work. One political party demands wide-ranging change, but offers no roadmap. The other promises a return to normalcy, but there is no going back. Something has to give.

In Friedman's reading, the election of 2024 is an intensification of things breaking down. Whomever is elected, whether Trump or Kamala, Friedman suggests that they will be ineffectual and social disruption will only intensify further. It is the election of 2032 or thereafter that he sees real change by a see-what-sticks policy-making effort, a lot of trial and error, like during the FDR administration in the 1930s. We are currently living 'in the storm', and an era of economic prosperity and geopolitical calm awaits … if we can get there.

Economist and blogger Noah Smith offers a similar take in his blog. He likens the 2010s and early 2020s to the 1960s and 1970s, with a prosperous 2030s - like the 1980s - just around the corner. Further, the excesses of the left (the Weathermen, campus takeovers, violent protests) steered the country toward a more centrist, or right-of-center, political era beginning with the so-called Reagan Revolution. Smith sees similar excesses of the left in the 2010s and 2020s - defund the police, pro-Palestinian/anti-Israel protests after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, the promotion of unconventional pronouns, decolonialism, degrowth, etc. - as similarly steering the country rightward. Then there are the excesses of the right: the cult of personality around Trump, virulent anti-immigration, election denial, rising authoritarianism, etc., that, in turn, may steer the country leftward. The result is a return to the political center. Knock on wood.

All of the authors noted so far are optimists. Which brings us to Bruno Maçães. Bruno, too, is an optimist, and he, too, argues that the US and the world are entering a new era. While all of the above authors note the economic and military development of China as one of the main challenges to the US-centric geopolitical order - and perhaps the main source of worry about the potential return of great power conflicts - Maçães argues that the US is uniquely (and geographically) poised to sort of 'go with the flow'. In other words, rather than conflict with China being unavoidable, Maçães sees China and/or the US pulling back. Both markets are simply too big to risk war. Further, Maçães argues that the US is uniquely malleable. It is historically a Western country, but its history of immigration and its physical separation from Europe and Asia make it potentially non-Western while also being non-Eastern. It can (and does) navigate between both worlds. It can lean in one direction or the other, whichever is more suitable to the times. (I'm not on board with this yet.)

Then there is Peter Zeihan. Not at all an optimist, and quite the pessimist. According to Zeihan, the age of low prices is rapidly fading into the past. And with the squeezing of the middle class over the last several decades, the crunch is about to hit home.

As China continues to develop economically and militarily, it will not only seek to challenge the American-created geopolitical world order, but to replace it with a more China-centric model. Which means all kinds of changes that Americans and Europeans are not ready for: No more freedom of the seas that the US Navy has enforced for nearly 250 years now. China claims the entirety of the South China Sea as Chinese national territory. It bullies Filipino shipping to steer clear of Chinese-claimed atolls. It's only a matter of time before China and other groups demand Chinese-issued licenses or Chinese-enforced access fees, either or both of which would no doubt cost millions of dollars. Houthis in Yemen could do the same in the Red Sea, and myriad pirates across the globe from the Straits of Malacca to the seas south of the Philippines to the coasts of Africa could follow suit. Remember the Barbary States of the 18th Century in modern day Libya? Those days, according to Peter Zeihan, are coming back, and transportation costs will skyrocket.

It is no less than the end of globalization, including the end of shifting manufacturing to China and other low-wage countries for lower production costs. Which in turn translates into higher prices for everything. And higher prices means economic instability and global political upheaval.

Personally, I think Fareed Zakaria, George Friedman, and Noah Smith are closer on the mark. Zeihan's take makes for good fiction, though. Hint, hint.